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NORMATIVE AND POLICY RESTRAINTS 
ONWAR 
William V. 0 'Brien* 
RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED 
CONFLICT. Edited by Michael Howard. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 1979. Pp. 173. $16.95. 
HUMANITARIAN POLITICS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS. By .David P. Forsythe. Baltimore: The Johns Hop-
kins University Press. 1977. Pp. 298. $17.95. 
Restraints on war arise from two basic sources. First, political 
and military policies, by defining the ends and means of war, deter-
mine whether war becomes "total" as in World Wars I and II or 
"limited." Second, normative principles and prescriptions may limit 
both ends and means of war. These normative limitations may de-
rive from morality or from positive law. Ideally, policy and norma-
tive restraints on war complement and support each other. When 
the restraints converge, there is great opportunity to ameliorate the 
destruction and suffering of war. However, political and military 
policies and normative guidelines do not always converge. The true 
task of the law of war is to maximize such convergences. 
The interrelation of the possible sources of restraint on war is 
therefore a matter of perennial importance. The relationships both 
within and between the two broad categories of normative and pol-
icy restraints are important. Political policy restraints are essential to 
the control of military policy, while military policy must find its jus-
tifi.cation in the service of political policy. Morality stands above 
policy as an external source of restraint. Yet, moral prescriptions 
divorced from the realities of policy may become irrelevant. Law is 
the meeting place for morality and policy. Ideally, the law of war 
reflects both sound moral principles and the realities of political and 
military policies. 
The two books here reviewed recognize and deal with this com-
plex of relationships. In Restraints on War_, Michael Howard and a 
* Professor of Government, Georgetown University. B.S.F.S. 1946, M.S.F.S. 1948, Ph.D. 
1953, Georgetown University. - Ed. 
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disti,nguished group of contributors address four categories of re-
straints on war and sometimes show their interrelations. Unfortu-
nately, the contributors do not always realize the promise of 
Howard's introductory chapter in developing the connections be-
tween politics, military policy, morality and law. Still, the ingredi-
ents for such analyses are there. David Forsythe's Humanitarian 
Politics analyzes the policy implications of a body of law which is 
conspicuously grounded in moral values. In a thorough study of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.), Forsythe em-
phasizes the political dimension of efforts to support and enforce hu-
manitarian law and to advance moral principles and initiatives not 
yet clearly provided for in that law. 
This review will consider Restraints on War .first. After describ-
ing Howard's introductory essay, it divides the book into two sets of 
essays: those dealing primarily with normative restraints on war, 
and those dealing primarily with policy restraints. Forsythe's mono-
graph will be discussed last, partly in the light of the issues raised in 
the evaluation of Howard's volume. 
I 
Howard, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is 
one of the foremost military historians and analysts of our time. In 
the opening essay of Restraints on War, Temperament a Belli: Can 
War be Controlled?, Howard builds on the central concept of control 
over the military instrument of policy. Howard first distinguishes 
force from violence: "War consists of such deliberate, controlled, 
and purposeful acts of force combined and harmonized to attain 
what are ultimately political objectives" (p. 3). He then observes 
that, "Military activity thus carries an intrinsic imperative towards 
control; an imperative derived from the need to maintain order and 
discipline, to conserve both moral and material forces and ensure 
that these are always responsive to direction" (pp. 3-4). Neverthe-
less, "[t]hese military criteria . . . will not necessarily coincide with 
the dictates of humanity" (p. 4). Recalling the countervalue strate-
gies of General Sherman in the American Civil War, Howard con-
cludes that "the military principle of 'economy of force' may 
sometimes conveniently coincide with the dictates of transcendent 
moral values, but there is little historical justification for assuming 
that this will always be the case" (p. 4). 
Howard's point that control is the essence of good military pol-
icy, but that political/military control does not always produce the 
results enjoined by normative or humanitarian restraints, is an im-
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portant one. Supporters of the law of war naturally tend to empha-
size its coincidence with enlightened political/military policies and, 
conversely, the self-defeating effects that often result from manifestly 
illegal behavior. This is a prominent theme, for example, in the 1976 
Air Force pamphlet, AFP 110-31, International Law - The Con-
duct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. 1 
Howard next sketches the development of the law of war as a 
source of external restraint on war. He reviews the traditional dis-
tinction between the jus ad bellum, the law governing recourse to 
armed force, and the jus in be/lo, the law governing the conduct of 
war. The moral doctrine of Just War produced the1ils ad bellum, 
while Grotius and subsequent framers of positive international law 
developed the jus in be/lo. In this survey Howard identifies the un-
derlying characteristics of the political system and of limited wars 
that made development of these normative restraints possible. 
In this century, when political and military realities changed to 
produce modem total war, the material bases on which both the 
moral just war doctrine and the international law of war had been 
grounded were destroyed. Total war between societies in conflict 
produced strategies that capitalized on modem military technology, 
strategies such as the countervalue strategic bombing policies of the 
RAF in World War II. These tactics represent an almost total diver-
gence between political/military policy and the moral/legal princi-
ples of proportion and particularly of discrimination or the 
immunity of noncombatants and nonmilitary targets from direct in-
tentional attacks. Neither morality nor law could make much of a 
stand against the necessities of total war. In the post-World War II 
era, the logic of political/military policy alone could revive limited 
war theories and policies. Thus, prudential rather than normative 
considerations gave hope of restoring restraints on war. At the same 
time that total war between nations has destroyed traditional norma-
tive restraints on war, wars of national liberation within nations have 
been waged with an "ends justifies the means" spirit that tends to 
make them particularly bitter and unrestrained, further endangering 
the prospects for normative regulation of war. The remaining essays 
in the book review these developments and assess the future pros-
pects for restraints on war. 
1. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW -THE CONDUCT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, at 5-8-5-10 (Nov. 1976). 
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A. Normative Restraints on War 
Geoffrey Best takes the lead in developing the first of Howard's 
themes, the restraint on war by normative principles and prescrip-
tions. Best, Professor of History at the University of Sussex, is a dis-
tinguished scholar whose recently published Humanity in Waifare 2 is 
an important contribution to the growing contemporary literature on 
the law of war. Best's essay, Restraints on War by Land before 1945, 
traces the ,evolution of the war from its customary form in the great 
era of limited war, 1648-1914, to its codification in the Hague Con-
ventions of 1899 and 1907. Best displays a profound understanding 
of the doctrinal developments in international law from the seven-
teenth to the twentieth centuries. Beyond that, however, he displays 
a commendable interest in military sociology, a subject that must be 
studied in connection with efforts to translate law into terms mean-
ingful to those to whom it is directed. Best writes: 
What soldiers actually think about conduct in war, and how their 
thoughts affect their conduct, is an area of this subject which has so far 
been very little explored. The legal and official literature, understand-
ably enough, takes no notice of the possibility that within armed forces 
a kind of sub-culture or 'private' culture may exist, the norms and ten-
dencies of which may conflict with those prescribed in the manuals of 
military conduct, etc. . . . 
The question then for the historian who wishes to embrace all rele-
vant possibilities is: what are the relations between this private mili-
tary culture which will lay its persuasive claims upon the thinking and 
behaviour of at least the regular soldier who has been acclimatized to 
it, and the public political culture from which his army as a whole 
ostensibly derives its standards and instructions? [P. 24.] 
Best pursues this issue with respect to the law and practice gov-
erning treatment of prisoners of war, pillage, and the protection of 
women. He finds that, even in the nineteenth century, the law of war 
was more effective in protecting soldiers than civilians. And as the 
twentieth century unfolded, the possibility of protecting civilians by 
the law of war was drastically reduced by the advent of total war. 
Thus the political/military policies that produced limited wars also 
made possible the developments of the principles of discrimination 
(or non-combatant immunity) in positive international law. But, as 
early as the American Civil War, the phenomenon of societies totally 
mobilized for war rendered plausible Sherman's proposition that the 
way to win such a war is through direct intentional attacks on the 
mobilized society itself. Best traces this development through the 
Franco-Prussian War to the two World Wars. 
2. G. BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980). 
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Best concludes with a brief examination of the phenomenon of 
popular resistance to military occupation and the resultant emer-
gence of guerilla war as a major form of modem conflict. This phe-
nomenon perpetuates civilian identification with war efforts and 
assures the continuance of political/military policies aimed at civil-
ians and their property, policies that remain at odds with the aspira-
tions of those who would revive the principle of discrimination. On 
the whole, then, Best finds discouraging prospects for the coinci-
dence of policy with morality and law in war. Indeed, he ends by 
asking, "has the civilian, as liberal Europe used to know him, be-
come extinct" (p. 36)? 
The same theme of divergence of policy from law is pursued by 
Bryan Ranft, formerly Professor of History at the Royal Naval Col-
lege, in his essay, Restraints on War at Sea before 1945. Ranft points 
out that much of the eighteenth and nineteenth century law of war at 
sea sought to negate the most decisive capability of naval warfare, 
namely, the ability to interdict and destroy vital merchant shipping. 
Ranft first recalls the long history of efforts to protect neutral ship-
ping and neutral goods and to require that naval blockades be effec-
tive and not "paper." Once again the material environment affected 
the state of law, for the greatest progress in regulating naval war-
fare preceded the development of modem industrialized states. 
Once it became clear that modem states were critically dependent on 
overseas imports and hence vulnerable to blockades, the pressures 
on the law of naval warfare became increasingly great. The last 
great attempt to salvage the traditional law of naval warfare at the 
1909 London Naval Conference failed utterly in the face of belliger-
ent naval policies in the First World War. By the end of that war, 
virtually all of the law of naval warfare, established with great effort 
over the preceding centuries, fell before the demands of total war 
policies. Ranft recalls that both the Allies and the Germans justified 
this process by the concept of reprisals. Indeed, the decline and fall 
of this once central part of international law is traceable directly to a 
reprisal spiral that traded illegal act for illegal act until there was no 
law left. 
Ranft concludes with a brief but critical point that might be 
called "technical necessity." World War I had shown the impossibil-
ity of treating submarines as though they were capable of observing 
the same law as surface warships. All pretense of uniform treatment 
was abandoned in World War II, when anti-submarine weapons sys-
tems, particularly maritime aircraft, made submarines extremely 
vulnerable. Accordingly, the interwar efforts (such as the 1922 
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Washington Conference, the 1930 London Conference, and the 
London Submarine Protocol of 1936) to codify a law regulating sub-
marine warfare failed completely. Ranft points out once again that 
the law is likely to collapse where there is an unreasonable gap be-
tween the demands of law and the material characteristics of the reg-
ulated subject matter. 
The same point is made with equal emphasis by Donald Cam-
eron Watt, Professor of International History, London School of Ec-
onomics, in his essay, Restraints on War in the Air before 1945. 
Indeed, Watt sees a pattern in the process by which efforts to regu-
late aerial bombardment failed: 
The first [step] is the attempt of an advanced but still belligerent 
society to devise restraints and inhibitions on the use of a weapon the 
technological development of which was so constantly to be out of 
phase with men's concepts of its use. The second is the manner in 
which those concerned with the problem moved from optimism to ex-
treme pessimism in their attitudes to the weapon and the technology 
that produced it. The third is the decline of overall moral standards 
and the dwindling of the ethical horizons of those responsible from a 
general to a purely national scale. [Pp. 58-59.] 
Watt also traces the origins of the Royal Air Force doctrines of 
strategic bombing and force development that predetermined, in 
great measure, the policies of the Second World War. The early 
prophets of air power in Britain, of whom Lord Hugh Trenchard 
was the foremost, held out a strategic deterrent policy as the best 
defense posture~ Indeed, this RAF doctrine greatly resembles the 
"more bang for the buck" policies of the Eisenhower Administration 
as it initiated nuclear strategic deterrence. Trenchard and others 
proposed that the RAF both adopt what we would now term 
countervalue policies, and develop capabilities to threaten a poten-
tial aggressor with a devastating assault on his cities. Although the 
RAF never achieved such a deterrent capability, it did proceed to the 
policy of "area" attacks on German cities in World War II, attacks 
that completely violated the traditional moral/legal principles of 
proportion and discrimination. 
Watt's brief review of air law and strategy before 1945 (actually, 
before 1939) leads him to generalize that, as this Reviewer has also 
observed,3 customary law grows and conventional law is viable 
where they have an adequate societal and material basis. In the first 
phase of the three-step process Watt describes in the quotation 
above, such a basis for law seems to exist. But, as the second two 
3. See O'Brien, Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War, 2 WORLD POLITY 35, 82-100 
(1960). 
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phases unfold, law tends to take the form of conventions that are 
increasingly out of harmony with the realities of modem warfare un-
til finally, in the third phase, the "ethical horizons" of those responsi-
ble for war shift from an international to a national scale. 
It should be added that Watt's essay and, to a lesser extent, those 
of Best and Ranft, suffer from the Editor's apparent mandate to stop 
at the Second World War. Best and Ranft do make important points 
about the practice in that war and its implications for the law of war, 
but Watt does not project his analysis beyond the tentative days of 
aerial combat during the "Phoney War'' before the fall of France. 
His comments on the realization during the rest of the war of the 
trends he has traced in RAF and U.S. Air Force strategic bombing 
practice are sorely missed. 
The last essay in Restraints on War, Wars of National Liberation 
and War Criminality by G.I.A.D. Draper, Professor of Law at the 
University of ·Sussex, is the most detailed in its legal analyses. 
Draper begins by picking up one of Howard's themes, the relation 
between the jus ad helium and the jus in be/lo. He reminds us that 
the emphasis on just cause for resort to war under the jus ad helium 
has historically conflicted with the insistence of the jus in be/lo that 
both sides in a war must observe its rules. This conflict abated in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the moral concept of just war 
declined and no substitute jus ad helium developed to distinguish 
legal from illegal belligerents. It was in this age of secular humanita-
rianism that much of the jus in be/lo was codified. However, starting 
with the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellog-Briand Pact, a 
new positive law jus ad helium was established. This new law distin-
guished aggressors who violated the prescriptions "outlawing" war 
as an instrument of policy from lawful belligerents engaged in wars 
of collective security and/or defense. Draper emphasizes, however, 
that the temptation to discriminate against aggressors with respect to 
rights and duties under thejus in be/lo was resisted. The 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, like the 1907 Hague Convention IV,4 "are im-
bued with humanitarian principles, and reject any idea of their 
4. Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague 
IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
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unequal application based on the legality or illegality of the 'cause' 
for which the belligerents have resorted to armed conflict" (p. 139). 
Recently, however, a new 'just war" concept has arisen which 
threatens the principle of equal application of the jus in hello. This 
new just war approach is a product of the importance given to the 
principle of self-determination by Third World nations and, ironi-
cally, of long-overdue efforts to apply the rights and duties of the jus 
in hello to participants in intranational conflicts. 
To begin with the second factor, many commentators have ob-
served a gap in the jus in hello insofar as participants in civil wars or 
internal conflicts are concerned. The only conventional law applica-
ble to such conflicts has been the common Article 3 of the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions. This Reviewer and others have long argued 
that there is a need for the law of war wherever there is a war in the 
material sense (j.e., widespread and prolonged combat carried on for 
political rather than criminal purposes). The goal of international 
law should be to increase the applicability of the law of war to 
noninternational conflicts.5 The Diplomatic Conference on Human-
itarian Law,6 1974-1977, pursued this goal by drafting a Protocol to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions explicitly addressed to noninterna-
tional armed conflicts. 
Draper's account soon reveals a disturbing development in the 
work of the Diplomatic Conference. The Third World states, 
cheered on by eleven nonvoting National Liberation Movement 
(N.L.M.) delegations, sought to proclaim and implement the princi-
ple of self-determination. This principle, which had been a common 
theme of Third World struggles for independence, already had been 
proclaimed repeatedly in international human rights conventions 
and General Assembly resolutions.7 Nevertheless, the Third World 
5. See, e.g., Baxter, Forces far Compliance with the Laws of War, American Society of 
International Law, Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting 82-92, 97 (article, panel discus-
sion, and co=ents by William V. O'Brien) (1964). 
6. The full designation for the Conference is the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirma-
tion and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. It 
should be noted that this designation, in addition to being somewhat pretentious and overlong, 
is confusing. Traditionally, the law of war was divided into the "Hague Law," which dealt 
with means and methods of warfare as well as with humanitarian protection of prisoners of 
war and civilians, and the "Geneva Law," which dealt exclusively with humanitarian protec-
tion. The 1977 Geneva Protocols deal with both Hague and Geneva subjects and it is mislead• 
ing to label them "humanitarian" only. 
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, includes among purposes and principles of the organiza-
tion the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples". The principle of self-determination is reaf-
firmed, inter alia, in the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples adopted by the General Assembly December 14, 1960, in G.A. Res. 1514, 15 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961), and in Articles 1 of both the U.N. 
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states wanted to concretize the right of self-determination through 
formal recognition of the belligerent rights of N.L.M.s that are still 
fighting for self-determination. Draper explains: 
The Third World States were not slow to see that a major political and 
a possible juridical advantage might be obtained, at one move, by se-
curing the insertion of a provision in the scope, Article, I, of Protocol I, 
whereby the struggles of peoples against colonial, alien, and racist re-
gimes should be included as situations to which the Conventions of 
1949 and Protocol 1 would be applicable. By orthodox legal thinking 
such struggles were internal armed conflicts to which the Article 3, 
common to the Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 2 might be applica-
ble. Once such 'peoples' struggles' for the selective purposes men-
tioned were ingested within the scope of Protocol I, they assuredly had 
no place in Protocol 2. The two Protocols had been drafted on the 
basis of mutual exclusion. For the National Liberation Movements 
and the Governments which supported them and who commanded the 
majority of votes, this was a political objective as manifest as it was 
desirable. [P. 146.] 
As a result of Third World pressures, Article 1 ( 4) of Protocol I, 
although designated as applying to international conflicts, became 
the source of belligerent rights for revolutionary forces hitherto not 
covered by any international law of war except the common Article 
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Under Article 1(4), Protocol I 
was said to apply, inter alia, to: 
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domina-
tion and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations.8 
The discussions preceding the adoption of this language indicate that 
very specific situations were meant to be covered by Article 1(4) of 
Protocol I. These include wars of national liberation against Israel, 
South Africa, and Portugal. Since the drafting of the Protocol, inter-
nal changes in government led Portugal to dissolve its African colo-
nial holdings and remove itself from what might be termed the wars-
of-national-liberation "Hit List" (my term, not Draper's). That 
leaves only Israel and South Africa. Needless to add, the Third 
World states voting for Article 1 ( 4) understood that they would not 
now or in the future be found guilty of "colonial domination" or 
International Covenants on Human Rights annexed to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 861 (1967). 
8. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened 
for signature December 12, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144, Annex l (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
1977 Geneva Protocol I], reprinted in 16 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977). 
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"alien occupation" or of maintaining a "racist regime." However, 
there is no reason to doubt that new villains may be added to the 
"Hit List," possibly including the United States. 
If the 1977 Geneva Protocol I becomes accepted in international 
legal practice, Article 1(4) will resolve the issue ofrecognition of bel-
ligerency in intranational wars in an awkward and discriminatory 
fashion. Most noninternational conflicts will be governed by Proto-
col II, which is vastly inferior to Protocol I as a convention regulat-
ing belligerent conduct (most notably, Protocol II fails to institute 
the protections for prisoners of war that are guaranteed to POWs in 
international conflicts). But hostilities termed "wars of national lib-
eration" against Israel and South Africa will be treated as interna-
tional conflicts, and belligerent revolutionary forces in these nations 
can claim the full benefits of Protocol I and, indeed, of the 1907 and 
1949 Hague and Geneva Conventions. Under this approach, PLO 
terrorism in Israel is an international conflict covered by Protocol I, 
while a Kurdish revolt against Iraq or Iran is a noninternational con-
flict that entitles the rebels only to the lesser protections of Protocol 
II. 
In addition to its discriminatory resolution of the issue of bellig-
erent status for purposes of application of the Jils in hello, Article 1 ( 4) 
of Protocol I promises to produce a revolutionary effect on the JUS ad 
helium. Under existing international law and the Charter of the 
United Nations, there are only two situations in which nations can 
legally resort to military force. One is during an enforcement action 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, a situation that has never arisen 
because of the lack of consensus among the permanent members of 
the Security Council. The other is during exercise of the Article 51 
right of individual and collective self-defense. If the 1977 Geneva 
Protocol I is accepted, resort to force in a third situation - wars of 
national liberation as defined in Article 1 ( 4) - will be authorized by 
the jus ad helium. Thus the trend of the contemporary jus ad helium 
to limit severely the circumstances in which belligerents can legally 
resort to armed force has been reversed. In effect, a new 'just war" 
category has been added to the jus ad helium. 
Having made these points, Draper observes that this victory for 
Third World values is obtained at the cost of imposing duties on 
revolutionary belligerents, duties that they may well be unable to 
honor in practice. A typical guerrilla force prosecuting a war of na-
tional liberation will find it quite difficult to meet many of the re-
quirements of Protocol I and of previous conventions of the jus in 
hello. As Draper observes, "[o)ccupation of enemy territories, the 
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conduct of hostilities, the appointment and functioning of Protecting 
Powers, the penal repression of 'grave breaches' and other topics 
governed by the Conventions and Protocol 1 present major difficul-
ties when applicable to N.L.M.s" (pp. 147-48). 
The Diplomatic Conference defined belligerency very differently 
under Protocol II than under Protocol I. Here the Third World 
states faced the possibility that they might be the target of revolu-
tionary insurrection, and they were at pains to limit the rights of 
those who might oppose their regimes by force. Article I of Protocol 
II imposes a high threshold of belligerency: it requires a continuous, 
high intensity conflict before revolutionary forces may profit from 
even the modest provisions of Protocol II.9 Thus, to continue the 
earlier example, the PLO qualifies per se for belligerent status be-
cause of its cause. Sporadic terrorist attacks that in no way satisfy 
the belligerency threshold of Protocol II nevertheless suffice to qual-
ify the PLO as a belligerent under Protocol I. On the other hand, a 
Kurdish revolutionary force in Iraq or Iran would have to maintain 
a broad, prolonged, uninterrupted, and highly successful guerrilla 
war in order to qualify for the lesser belligerent rights afforded by 
Protocol II. 
Draper concludes with a consideration of the problems of enforc-
ing the now expanded law of war. He notes that, because communist 
and Third World countries have often refused to accept or cooperate 
with the International Committee of the Red Cross, there may be no 
certified impartial third party to monitor compliance with the law. 
And because reprisals are so widely limited by explicit limitations in 
the older Conventions and the new Protocols, there remains very lit-
tle in the way of legally permissible retaliation to deter and punish 
violations of the law. 10 Finally, Draper discusses the problems 
9. 1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, 
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims oflnternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory 
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military opera-
tions and to implement this Protocol. 
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as 
not being armed conflicts. 
Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened 
for signature December 12, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144, Annex II (1977), reprinted in 16 INTL. 
LEGAL MATERIALS 1442 (1977). 
10. The issue of dwindling reprisal rights in the fas in be/lo is examined in O'Brien, The Jus 
in Bello in Revo/utiona,:,v War and Counter insurgency, 18 VA. J. INTL. L. 193, 237-40 (1978). 
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caused by emphasis in the Protocols on the punishment and preven-
tion of "grave breaches." Draper calls attention to the difficulties 
English municipal law has experienced in translating the concept of 
punishment of grave breaches into domestic law and legal proce-
dures. Similar problems face the United States, and they will doubt-
less be discussed when the Protocols are submitted to the Senate. 
Draper reiterates that national liberation movements will have little 
or no capability to punish grave breaches. Draper thus raises the 
specter of a double standard under which the developed states are 
expected to comply with an expanded body of international law and 
to enforce it through appropriate domestic law proceedings, while 
their potential adversaries in revolutionary or counterinsurgency 
wars are measured against reduced expectations of compliance. All 
of this leads Draper to question the ability of the jus in hello, at the 
moment of its apparent reaffirmation and expansion, to curb the ex-
cesses of belligerents fighting under the banners of new 'Just wars." 
B. Policy Restraints in War 
The other three essays in Howard's book deal with the limited 
war aspect of restrictions of international conflict. John C. Garnett, 
Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies at the Univer-
sity College of Wales, Aberystwyth, presents a useful analysis of the 
meaning and implications of Limited 'Conventional' War in the Nu-
clear Age. Along with such authorities as Robert Osgood and Ber-
nard Brodie, 11 he prefers to restrict the term "limited war" to wars in 
which the superpowers are involved and in which they deliberately 
restrict the use of available military capabilities. For Garnett, the 
heart of the matter is not so much the limitation of ends as of means. 
When nuclear powers are directly or indirectly involved in a conflict, 
limiting means may prevent escalation to nuclear war. Accordingly, 
he excludes "small" and "local'' wars that do not involve belligerents 
with nuclear capabilities or nuclear-capable allies from his discus-
sion. While this is a reasonable approach, others may prefer to hold 
out guidelines for limited war that can be applied in substantial 
measure to all belligerents.12 
Having specified his elite concept of limited conventional war, 
11. See B. BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE 309 (1959); Osgood, The Reappraisal of 
Limited War, in PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY 92, 94 (1970). 
12. The Reviewer attempts a more comprehensive approach to the definition of limited 
war and the development of guidelines applicable to most belligerents in O'Brien, Guidelines 
for Limited War, MIL. REV., Feb. 1979, at 64. This approach will be elaborated in THe Cor-i-
DUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (forthcoming). 
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Garnett analyzes the differences between such wars and ordinary 
conventional wars. The problem for belligerents faced with a pos~i-
bility of nuclear escalation is to "win" enough to achieve the desired 
ends but not so much as to risk nuclear escalation. A second distinc-
tive objective in such wars is to deploy forces in such a way as to 
permit effective conventional :fighting without rendering them exces-
sively vulnerable to nuclear attack should escalation occur. The so-
lution to the first and more important problem is to develop implicit 
"ground rules" of conflict, a concept suggested in Kissinger's early 
writing and elaborated by other strategic thinkers such as Thomas 
Schelling. 13 One such implicit ground rule is the restriction on 
bombing targets that the U.S. Air Force observed during its attacks 
on North Korea and North Vietnam. 
The concept of tacit rules of conflict is attractive to the propo-
nents of both limited war and the international law of war. When 
they are successfully established by the patterns of behavior and ex-
pectation in a conflict, ground rules reconcile policy with the norma-
tive goals of limiting war. As Garnett points out, however, 
enthusiasm for such rules of conflict is often limited to elite propo-
nents of limitation. Particularly in a liberal democracy, the apparent 
or real sacrifices of possible military advantage resulting from such 
ground rules are often viewed with concern and can generate out-
right opposition. The problem of limited war, then, is in retaining 
enough military effectiveness to assure a reasonable probability of 
success while also significantly limiting the more destructive and 
.dangerous methods of warfare, and in achieving both these objec-
tives while retaining the support of a society that wants a rapid and 
successful conclusion to the conflict. 
In a searching application of these concepts to NATO strategies, 
Garnett explores the problems of reconciling the provision of an ad-
equate limited defense of Europe with the maintenance of a strategic 
deterrent. The paradox is that too convincing a conventional de-
fense capability may undercut the credibility of the strategic nuclear 
deterrent. There seems to be little danger that this will become a 
critical dilemma in the near future, given the inadequacies of 
NATO's present conventional forces vis-a-vis those of the Warsaw 
Pact. Nevertheless, Garnett is quite right in raising this dilemma, for 
it is one that will always confront NATO and, indeed, other similar 
13. H. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 140-41 (1957); T. SCHEL-
LING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966). The principal authorities on limited war are cited and 
their suggested ground rules incorporated into limited war guidelines in O'Brien, supra note 
12. 
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defense alliances. Moreover, Garnett has put his finger on one of the 
profound issues of modem deterrence and defense: Is it better to 
maximize a nation's ability to fight limited wars in the event that 
strategic nuclear deterrence fails, and in the process perhaps impair 
that deterrence or to put everything into strategic deterrence in the 
hope that it will be effective in preventing "limited" and unlimited 
major wars? 
Laurence Martin continues many of Garnett's themes in his es-
says on Limited Nuclear War. Martin is Vice-Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Newcastle upon Tyne and one of the foremost strategic 
thinkers writing today. His essay distinguishes two approaches to 
limited nuclear war: (1) tactical nuclear war, and (2) strategic lim-
ited nuclear war. The first, an integral part of NATO's defenses, 
plays a complicated role because of the "creative ambiguity" (p. 106) 
inherent in the ability of NATO forces to opt either for conventional 
nonnuclear defense policies or for conventional plus limited nuclear 
defense policies. Although this creative ambiguity contributes to de-
terrence, it is a constant source of apprehension within NATO. The 
United States fears the escalatory implications of any decision to use 
nuclear weapons, even at a battlefield tactical level. The Europeans 
prefer to rest primarily on the protection of U.S. strategic nuclear 
deterrence and, understandably, dread the prospect of an inordi-
nately destructive tactical nuclear defense of Western Europe. These 
fears of the NATO allies are compounded by concern for the ade-
quacy of common-control arrangements and the problems of coordi-
nating political and military decisions and policies. 
One solution to these problems, Martin suggests, might be a 
"mini-nuke" strategy: tactical nuclear weapons would be employed 
from the outset of an invasion (with no conventional "pause") under 
policies designed to control collateral damage in the areas defended 
(pp. 109-10). Still, Martin admits, the destruction would be very ex-
tensive and, most importantly, there would be no assurance that the 
Soviets would cooperate in maintaining nuclear thresholds and 
ground rules. This, of course, is a nagging issue in any limited war 
discussion. When the enemy has equal or superior capabilities and 
options, there is no assurance that he will see an interest in tacit 
ground rules advantageous to the other side. 
After examining the second type of limited nuclear policy - the 
"limited strategic options" strategy advocated by Secretary of De-
fense James Schlesinger (and revived once again the summer of 1980 
in President Carter's Presidential Directive 59) - Martin concludes 
that the possibility of nuclear war is a permanent reality. He states: 
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It would be absurd to believe that such powerful means of destruction 
can be wholly and permanently divorced from political conflicts. The 
question thus becomes in what way can this linkage best be handled so 
as to minimize conflict and, above all, to avert all-out nuclear war. 
Limited nuclear war thus presents a familiar dilemma: how to steer a 
course between relatively manageable strategies for employment and 
the horrifying prospects of catastrophe, so as best to preserve the deter-
rent and stabilizing influence of the nuclear balance? [P. 119.] 
It is appropriate to end this review of Howard's book with a cri-
tique of D.P. O'Connell's essay, Limited War at Sea since 1945. 
O'Connell, whose untimely death since the publication of this book 
was a major loss to international and relations scholarship, was the 
Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford. One 
might have expected a formal legal emphasis in his chapter. But al-
though O'Connell begins by noting the need for legal justification for 
use of force in self-defense, he emphasizes the kind of "ground rule" 
limitations on policy stressed by Garnett and Martin. He suggests 
that such limitations are to be found in three broad forms: (1) limi-
tations on the theater of operations wherein naval force will be ap-
plied; (2) limitations on the scale of operations and the level of 
weaponry; and (3) graduation of force and scale of response. 
Significantly, the author of the foremost contemporary compre-
hensive treatise on international law in English says of the first kind 
of limitation: "Whether the localization of the conflict at sea is a 
legal concept or merely a matter of prudence is a moot question" (p. 
126). To illustrate how open the issue remains, O'Connell contrasts 
U.S. policy in the Vietnam War with India's conduct in its 1971 war 
with Pakistan. The United States limited interdictory naval opera-
tions to within twelve miles of the coasts of North and South Viet-
nam. By contrast, India pursued its war on the high seas, thus 
refusing to accept a common contemporary limited war guideline. 
O'Connell offers the U.S. policies regarding mining Haiphong 
Harbor as examples of the second and third types of implicit limita-
tions distinguished above. O'Connell, a classical international law 
publicist, demonstrates his cognizance of the critical importance of 
limited war rules of engagement by concluding: "The intellectual 
framework of limited war has thus become an essential component 
of the professional activity of naval staffs" (p. 134). Thus, 
O'Connell's essay again illustrates the theme of the Howard volume: 
the interaction of policy and normative restraints produces a spec-
trum of prescriptions and guidelines ranging from political/military 
rules of conflict to practices leading to customary international law 
to restatements in the form of international conventions. 
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II 
David P. Forsythe's Humanitarian Politics is an extraordinarily 
comprehensive and scholarly monograph on the work of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) in developing and im-
plementing the humanitarian law of war. Forsythe, who is now a 
professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, has 
served as a consultant to several Red Cross agencies and committees. 
His book is a significant case study of the interaction of the basic 
normative and policy restraints on war. Forsythe's dedicated ap-
praisal of the I.C.R.C.'s goals and efforts leaves little doubt about 
their moral emphasis. Yet Forsythe looks beyond the organization's 
efforts to maximize the automatic operation of formal humanitarian 
law and of the I.C.R.C.'s role in that process: he steadfastly probes 
into politics to find ways in which the I.C.R.C. can do things that 
could not be agreed upon in the law-making processes of the con-
temporary decentralized international legal system. Forsythe's dis-
tinctive criticism is that the I.C.R.C. should recognize the limits 
imposed by the need for consensus in modern international law and 
should, accordingly, reach beyond the law to politics to accomplish 
tasks required by morality. 
Forsythe traces the development of the Red Cross movement, 
places the I.C.R.C. in the context of the larger Red Cross organiza-
tion in Switzerland and worldwide, and explains its functions and 
basic philosophy. He also explores in detail its ad hoc diplomacy on 
behalf of political prisoners, its role in the development of humanita-
rian international law, and its better known activities in providing 
protection for prisoners of war and civilian victims of war. All of 
this analysis is based on extensive study of the archives of the organi-
zation, on interviews with key personnel, and on the broader schol-
arly literature on humanitarian law. 
Forsythe concludes his study with an analysis of three "chal-
lenges" to the I.C.R.C. in the future: the challenge of self-identifica-
tion, the challenge of evaluating law and the challenge of moral 
choice (pp. 231-35). Forsythe contends that the challenge of self-
identification raises the issue of whether the LC.RC. should remain 
an "establishment" humanitarian agency representing Swiss and 
Western values and approaches, or whether it should instead become 
a spokesman for "mankind" that employs new and perhaps radical 
approaches in a quest for greater protection of human values (pp. 
228-42). 
The challenge of evaluating law involves critical review of both 
the utility of international law as an instrument for the protection of 
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human rights and the role of the I.C.R.C. in developing humanita-
rian law. Forsythe is troubled by the emphasis in contemporary in-
ternational law on the rights and prerogatives of sovereign states. He 
finds an excessive deference to the rights of states. This, of course, is 
not surprising given the present decentralized international law-
making process wherein states make, interpret, and apply the law for 
themselves. Forsythe thinks that the task of developing and super-
vising more of this kind of law, always with proper deference to the 
rights of sovereign states, is an insufficient challenge for the I.C.R.C. 
Forsythe believes the I.C.R.C. should transcend legal purposes and 
methods to emphasize ad hoc diplomacy on behalf of human rights, 
rather than organize more conferences to produce conventional hu-
manitarian law and exert more efforts to implement that law (pp. 
242-45). A prominent example of this ad hoc diplomacy is provided 
in the record of I. C.R. C. involvement on behalf of political prisoners 
during the "colonels'" regime in Greece from 1967-1974 (pp. 76-84). 
Forsythe's chaP.ters on prote~tion of political prisoners and inter-
vention in cases of hijacking, kidnapping, and other situations not 
covered by international law offer further examples of this ad hoc 
diplomatic approach. 
Finally, Forsythe explores the challenge of moral choice that 
faces the I.C.R.C. He distinguishes between three forms of humani-
tarianism: impartial, international, and revolutionary (p. 227). Im-
partial humanitarianism, the typical practice of the I.C.R.C. and the 
UN High Commission for Refugees, is based on a theory of "discreet 
incrementalism," the "one more blanket" theory of doing what one 
can to alleviate suffering. Two working premises underlie this ap-
proach: the humanitarian organization should operate with the con-
sent of the government having jurisdiction over the persons 
requiring protection, and the organization should rarely if ever criti-
cize that government in public. There is a tradeo.ff between practical 
relief and initiatives that might pressure those in control of the per-
sons who are in need of assistance to drastically change their poli-
cies. International humanitarianism, typified by Amnesty 
International, operates with consent of the government with jurisdic-
tion over the persons to be protected at some times and without that 
government's consent at others. Under this approach, the 
humanitarian organization does not hesitate to criticize or to seek 
fundamental changes in the state of affairs that has produced the 
need to provide protection. Revolutionary humanitarianism, typi-
fied by the Joint Church Aid (JCA) organization's activities in the 
Biafra War in Nigeria, disregards the wishes and claims of public 
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authorities and does whatever it can both to ameliorate and to elimi-
nate the conditions requiring humanitarian intervention. 
The moral challenge to the I.C.R.C. is whether to continue to 
pursue "discreet humanitarianism," impartial humanitarianism, or 
move in the direction of international or revolutionary humanitari-
anism. Forsythe's own recommendations are twofold. First, he 
thinks that "the ICRC should move to make Geneva law more effec-
tive and more oriented to human needs rather than state interests, 
when the two values are divergent" (p. 244). He gives as an example 
the I.C.R.C. position on the 1977 Geneva Protocols discussed above 
in the review of Draper's essay. 14 Like this Reviewer, Forsythe 
would have urged that one Protocol should govern all armed con-
flict. This was the original position of the I.C.R.C. However, it ulti-
mately bowed to the wishes of the governments participating in the 
Diplomatic Conference, even though the second Protocol, which 
governed noninternational conflicts, offered quite inferior humanita-
rian protections to the first, which governed internal conflicts. 
Finally, Forsythe contends that "the ICRC should move to make 
as much of its work as possible alegal" (p. 244). In terms that will 
surely shake the traditional image of both the role of humanitarian 
law and the I.C.R.C., Forsythe argues: 
This "delegalization" process would counteract certain claims by states 
- viz., that the law did not apply, that the law only required X but not 
Y, that use of the law led to implications about the overall nature of 
the situation that the state wished to avoid. In many situations an 
ICRC alegal, purely humanitarian approach might produce considera-
ble humanitarian results. Geneva law should be regarded as a necessary 
evil and a last resort, useful in some but not all situations (emphasis ad-
ded). [P. 244.] 
Conclusion 
In these two important contributions to the literature of the law 
of war and limited war, Howard and his associates and Forsythe 
demonstrate the interaction of normative and policy restraints on 
war. At a time of great interest in revival and improvement of the 
law of war - or, as it is increasingly called, the law of international 
and/or noninternational conflict - it is imperative for moralists, 
lawyers, scholars of political/military policy, and decision makers to 
ponder the choice of strategies in developing restraints on war. 
Howard's volume shows the critical relationship between polit-
ical/military policies and capabilities and normative restraint. The 
14. See text at notes 4-10.rupra. 
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essays suggest that it may prove more helpful to develop tacit, infor-
mal ground rules of conflict rather than to attempt to codify interna-
tional law restrictions on belligerent means of destruction. 
Forsythe penetrates into the "holy of holies" of the law of war -
Red Cross, Geneva, humanitarian law - and suggests that political 
approaches, based on moral objectives and transcending both law 
and legal techniques of restraint, may offer the best strategy to pro-
tect human rights. Together, the two books provide indispensable 
discussions, discussions on which those interested in restraint on war 
should reflect profoundly if this most difficult enterprise is to have a 
chance of influencing the dangerous trend of contemporary conflict. 
